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ABSTRACT
This study examines how female representation in local elected (mayor and legis-
lature) and administrative (mid-level manager) positions influences municipal finan-
cial decision-making in 764 Japanese city-level governments. Findings show that
female representation in local councils is positively correlated with risk-averse beha-
viour in financial decisions, as female representation on the legislature is negatively
associated with issuing municipal bonds and with local investment in public cor-
porations. Female representation in executive (mayor and vice-mayor) and mid-level
administrative managerial positions has no apparent effects on local financial deci-
sions. This study tests existing explanations of relationships between female man-
agerial representation and fiscal behaviour in an Asian developed setting
characterized by considerable underrepresentation of women in politics.
KEYWORDS Local government; financial decision-making; gender representation; Japan
Introduction
Large volumes of studies have examined gender differences in preferences, attitudes,
and behaviours and impacts of differences on employee behaviours and organiza-
tional outcomes. However, the intersection of gender representation and public
financial decisions is not well understood. This study examines one particularly
understudied aspect of this intersection: gender and risk-taking behaviour in public
finance. Existing studies of economics and business management suggest women’s
preferences and attitudes towards risk differ from men’s. On average, women are less
willing to take financial risks (Bernasek and Shwiff 2001; Charness and Gneezy 2012;
Croson and Gneezy 2009; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). Therefore, such gender
differences in risk attitudes may or may not affect overall firm performance (Huang
and Kisgen 2013; Atkinson, Baird, and Frye 2003; Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 2014;
Bellucci, Borisov, and Zazzaro 2010; Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa 2015; Pletzer
et al. 2015). Few studies have examined how this gender difference plays out regard-
ing risk-taking behaviour in local public finance.
In private financial economics, scholarship has examined how gender affects firm
performance and financial decision-making (Berger, Kick, and Schaeck 2014;
Charness and Gneezy 2012; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Post and Byron 2015;
Schubert et al. 1999). In contrast to this research, the gender–financial decision-
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making connection in the public sector has been largely understudied. Examining
gender effects on public finance is important from the perspective of representative
bureaucracy (Meier and Melton 2014), which suggests that women’s life experiences
and preferences differ significantly from those of men, leading to differences in
administrative decision-making. Additionally, existing studies on representative
bureaucracy report gender-based differences in employee behaviours and attitudes
and the impacts of gender on organizational outcomes (Esteve et al. 2012; Grissom,
Nicholson-Crotty, and Keiser 2012; Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Meier and
Funk 2016; Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Lavena 2014; Saidel and Loscocco 2005).
Likewise, political scientists have reported female representation in legislatures affects
service provision, content and approval of legislation, committee assignments, levels
of corruption, and political trust and participation (Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti 2001;
Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Lawless 2004;
Wängnerud 2009).
Most published studies on women’s political representation focus on the
national level; very few address gender representation at the local level (Pini
and McDonald 2011). This omission contrasts with increasing participation of
women in local politics. Although female presence at the local level is far from
achieving gender parity, a considerable increase exists worldwide in female repre-
sentation in both local elected and appointed posts. This momentum may reflect a
perception that participation in local politics is more attainable for women.
However, limited attention has been devoted to identifying women’s impact in
local governance.
To address this gap, this study assesses the link between gender representation and
risk-taking/aversion in local public finance by exploring the role of female represen-
tation in municipal financial decision-making. Our first goal is to test how local
female representation in elected (mayor, vice-mayor, and legislature) and adminis-
trative (middle-level manager) positions influences financial decision-making, in
terms of issuing municipal bonds, investment in public corporations, and
budget allocations to reserve funds. Our second goal is to test whether political
ideology and expertise of females in administrative and legislative positions affect
municipal financial decisions, as politicians’ ideology also may affect their preferences
in financial decision-making (Petry 1982). Studies report evidence for the ‘ideology
thesis,’ which suggests conservatives prefer low spending, low taxes, and less debt at
national and state levels (Alt and Lowry 1994; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999).
Furthermore, female legislators’ experience is expected to influence their financial
decisions.
We test our propositions using a data set of 764 Japanese cities from 2007 to 2012.
We focus on city-level municipalities, excluding towns and villages. After controlling
for potential confounding factors, findings show female representation in local
councils and conservative ideology of local councils are positively correlated with
risk-averse behaviour in financial decision-making. Specifically, female representation
in city councils is negatively associated with issuing municipal bonds and with local
investment in public corporations. In addition, local council ideology is negatively
correlated with issuing municipal bonds and budget allocation to reserve funds.
However, females in executive and mid-level managerial positions don’t appear to
affect local financial decisions. Female councillors’ expertise also doesn’t appear to
influence municipal financial decision-making.
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This research contributes to literature in several ways. The study adds to under-
standing the impacts of gender representation on local public finance. The idea of
gender-based differences in risk-taking behaviour has been well established in eco-
nomics and finance literature. Although several studies examine the impacts of
gender composition in managerial positions on firm performance, limited scholar-
ship exists about the impacts of gender representation in local public office on
municipal financial behaviour. Our study tests if the gender–financial decision-mak-
ing relationship in private organizations holds for public organizations. Second, our
research examines female legislators’ influence in local legislatures. Our study focuses
on cities and examines gender effects on fiscal decision-making. Third, by testing our
propositions in a Confucian male-dominant society (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig
1973) with relatively low female representation in politics and society compared to
other advanced democracies (Ogai 2001; Eto 2010; Bochel and Bochel 2005; Bochel
et al. 2003; World Economic Forum n.d.; UNDP 2016), this study assesses whether
female representation in a male-dominant context is associated with changes in
financial decision-making. Japanese political and social systems are still male domi-
nant. Therefore, political and administrative institutions are gendered towards males
(Acker 1992). Our findings show even in male-dominant institutions, the presence of
female city councillors does influence financial performance.
This paper is organized into five sections. The first section introduces concepts of
gender representation and attributes of female representatives, provides rationale for
testing these factors, and derives the testable hypotheses. The second section provides
background information on Japanese municipalities and their experiences with gen-
der representation. The third section describes the research design and variable
operationalization, followed by a fourth section containing results and analysis. The
fifth section presents conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research.
The impact of gender representation on policy outcomes
Existing scholarship has examined whether the degree of gender representation
affects organizational outcomes in private, non-profit, and public organizations.
Scholars investigate how gender representation in managerial positions impacts
firm performance (Post and Byron 2015). Previous studies have examined how
gender affects policy priorities (Holman 2014; Ferreira and Gyourko 2014; Svaleryd
2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-Figueras 2011; Funk and Gathmann
2006; Smith 2014; Bratton and Ray 2002), budget size and balance (Krogstrup and
Wälti 2011; Ferreira and Gyourko 2014; Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Funk and
Gathmann 2006), socio-economic outcomes (Ferreira and Gyourko 2014; Clots-
Figuerasa 2012), leadership styles (Rinehart 1991), governance style and members’
participation (AbouAssi and An 2017; Fox and Schuhmann 2000; LeRoux 2009),
partnership (AbouAssi, Makhlouf, and Whalen 2016), work-related behaviour
(Nielsen 2015), and further female representation (Meier and Funk 2016;
Bradshaw, Murray, and Wolpin 1996).
The principle underlying these studies is that women have different perspectives
and preferences from men. Therefore, involving women in government brings a new
set of concerns in decision-making and consequently affects policies (Bratton and
Ray 2002). Empirical evidence supports this notion. For instance, Chattopadhyay and
Duflo (2004) report elected female leaders across 265 Indian villages tend to invest
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more in the provision of services closely associated with women’s interests and
concerns. Likewise, Smith (2014) documents that US municipalities with empowered
female leaders are likely to have more women-friendly policies. Empirical evidence of
women’s different leadership styles also derives from the non-profit sector. For
example, NGOs led by female managers are likely to form partnerships and have
more partners than male-led NGOs and encourage more members’ participation in
their activities in Lebanon (AbouAssi, Makhlouf, and Whalen 2016).
Other studies suggest that the effects of female politicians on policy outcomes are
contingent on other factors. For example, in her study of US municipalities, Holman
(2014) suggests that even at the municipal level, and despite limited fiscal autonomy,
the presence of a female mayor increases social welfare spending. Holman also finds
the presence of female councillors alone does not change spending on social welfare
programmes when the city’s mayor isn’t female. Only when the mayor is female does
the per cent of female councillors significantly increase welfare spending. Clots-
Figuerasa (2012) also reports empirical evidence for a contingent effect, as she
finds an increase in female representatives enhances an individual’s probability of
attaining primary education in urban areas, but not in rural areas. The effect of
women on policy outcomes also seems to be contingent on the type of policy area.
For instance, investigating the link between female mayor and municipal government
size, spending allocation patterns, employment, and crime rates in US cities, Ferreira
and Gyourko (2014) find the mayor’s gender is unrelated to these outcomes. This
variation of findings across policy areas can be explained on the ground that ‘women
hold different attitudes and priorities than do men’ (Bratton and Ray 2002, 429). The
variation of findings calls for further tests on females’ role in understudied local
issues.
Gender differences and financial decision-making
Although previous studies have examined relationships between gender representa-
tion and policy outcomes, scarce research has explored gender representation–public
finance connection. In the private sector, literature has reported a strong link
between gender and individual preference and behaviour regarding financial deci-
sion-making (Barber and Odean 2001; Bernasek and Shwiff 2001; Charness and
Gneezy 2012; Croson and Gneezy 2009; Eckel and Grossman 2008; Filippin and
Crosetto 2016; Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Schubert et al. 1999). Specifically,
these studies find women exhibit more risk aversion in financial decision-making
than men. For instance, using US survey data, Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998) find
single women report more risk-averse behaviour in terms of household holdings of
risky assets than do single men. Similarly, Charness and Gneezy (2012) reassess data
from 15 experimental studies and find a strong connection between gender and risk-
taking preferences. Their results suggest women tend to make smaller investments in
risky financial assets than men.
Other studies examine how gender representation in managerial positions affects
corporate performance (Chen, Crossland, and Huang 2014; Dezsö and Ross 2012;
Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa 2015; Post and Byron 2015; Pletzer et al. 2015). The
notion is that top managers’ traits and preferences affect corporate financial policies
(Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2013). These studies have produced mixed results. For
instance, a meta-analysis of 140 studies by Post and Byron (2015) reports a small
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correlation between gender diversity on firm boards and financial performance. By
using a panel data of US commercial banks, Palvia, Vähämaa, and Vähämaa (2015)
report, after controlling for other factors, banks with female CEOs are more finan-
cially conservative and tend to have higher levels of equity capital, suggesting female
CEOs exhibit risk-averse behaviour. However, based on their meta-analysis of 20
studies on female representation and firm performance, Pletzer et al. (2015) conclude
financial performance of firms is not significantly related to female representation on
corporate boards.
Do gender fiscal differences found in the private sector apply to public organiza-
tions? Surprisingly, limited attention has been paid to the impact of gender on risk-
taking behaviour in public finances. Some of the few exceptions examine the gender’s
role in government spending at the macro level. For example, Krogstrup and Wälti
(2011) and Funk and Gathmann (2006) explore how granting female voting rights
affects government deficits. These studies find the enfranchisement of women is
related to lower levels of budget deficits (Krogstrup and Wälti 2011) and lower
spending levels (Funk and Gathmann 2006).
Results of studies of representative bureaucracies suggest gender representation
affects organizational outcomes, such as promotion of coproduction (Riccucci, Van
Ryzin, and Li 2016), social justice (D’Agostino 2015), active female representation
(Wilkins 2006), and law enforcement (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Studies of
female representation in legislatures also show a positive influence of female elected
officials on women-friendly policy outputs (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Clots-
Figuerasa 2012; Park 2014; Smith 2014; Svaleryd 2009). Another line of scholarship
suggests women legislators tend to initiate proposals on social, family, and feminist
issues, while male representatives place emphasis on economic and business issues
(Saint-German 1989; Volden, Wiseman, and Wittmer 2013). These results have led
us to propose that local female representation in appointed and elected posts is
associated with risk-averse behaviour in financial decision-making. Therefore, follow-
ing previous studies on gender impacts on finance, we generate these two hypotheses:
H1a: Female representation in local legislatures is negatively correlated with risk-
taking behaviour in fiscal decision-making.
H1b: Female representation in local public managerial positions (executive and
administrative) is negatively correlated with risk-taking behaviour in fiscal decision-
making.
Public manager positions (H1b) refer to mayor, vice-mayor, and mid-level manager
positions.
Ideology of legislators
Legislators’ ideology may affect their preferences and behaviour. Our study focuses
on ideology of legislators, not mayors. This is because most mayors aren’t affiliated
with any political party in the Japanese context, even though they receive support
from political parties during election campaigns. For instance, 2 out of 809 mayors
were affiliated with political parties in 2011 (Chihō Jichi Sōgō Kenkyūjo 2012). The
‘government ideology thesis’ suggests parties aren’t only vote seekers but also policy
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seekers (Petry 1982). While conservatives prefer low spending, low taxes, and less
debt, liberals prefer higher spending and higher taxes and are more likely to acquire
debt (Alt and Lowry 1994; Kontopoulos and Perotti 1999). Studies report evidence
for the ideology thesis at national and state levels. A study by Erikson and colleagues
(1989) found public opinion and Democratic Party control explain most state
policies. Likewise, Alt and Lowry (1994) demonstrated party affiliation influences
state spending in the USA, and Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999) provide cross-
national evidence for the liberal and conservative policy preferences. Therefore, if
ideology matters, we should see its effect in local public finances. That is, conservative
legislators are expected to be more risk-averse in investing and issuing municipal
bonds. Consequently,
H2a: Conservative representation in local legislatures is negatively correlated with
risk-taking behaviour in fiscal decision-making.
We should expect a multiplicative risk-aversion effect in financial decision-making
in conservative legislatures with greater female representation. Therefore,
H2b: The greater the number of conservative legislators and the greater the number
of female legislators, the greater the risk-averse behaviour in fiscal decision-making.
Expertise of female legislators
The expertise level of female legislators should matter for fiscal decision-making.
According to Ericsson, Krampe, and Tesch-Römer (1993), expertise refers to the
‘domain-specific skills and knowledge important to attainment of expert perfor-
mance’ (365), and ‘is acquired slowly over a very long time as a result of practice’
(366). That is, with extensive practice, an individual can become very adept at a
particular task or job, whether technical, non-technical, or both, because ‘[e]xperts
are faster and more accurate . . . and their memory for representative stimuli from
their domain is vastly superior to that of lesser experts, especially for briefly
presented stimuli’ (Ericsson, Krampe, and Clemens 1993, 365). Experience on a
particular task leads chief executives to accumulate (1) wisdom, (2) in-depth
knowledge, (3) ability to respond to situations, and (4) group experience, which
together constitute expertise (Avellaneda 2016, see also Littlepage, Robison, and
Reddington 1997).
Empirical evidence has shown experts’ superior performance is acquired through
long experience, and the effect of practice on performance is large (Ericsson, Krampe,
and Clemens 1993, 365–368, see also Glaser, Chi, and Farr 1988). A recent study of
US legislation in Congress over 30 years by Volden and colleagues (2013) ‘reveals that
most (but not all) of the classically considered women’s issues are indeed raised at an
enhanced rate by congresswomen,’ yet these proposals have been less successful than
those of male legislators. One reason for less success may be female legislators’
preference for advocating women’s issues, welfare, and education matters.
Moreover, while female politicians have been historically less inclined to address
business and economics matters (Saint-German 1989), a longer duration of experi-
ence in local legislatures may lead them to be more likely to become risk-takers in
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public finances. Politicians with more experience are expected to learn from past
decisions, allowing them to have better judgement in taking more risks Therefore,
H3: Expertise of female legislators is positively correlated with risk-taking behaviour in
fiscal decision-making.
Research setting: Japanese local governments
The setting for this study is Japanese local governments. Japan is suitable for the
following reasons. First, as Japanese local governments face the highest debt-to-GDP
ratio (226 per cent) among Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development countries (OECD 2015), they experience continued central government
pressures to improve local public finance. Most local overspending derives from rapid
population ageing and inadequate revenue collection due to prolonged economic
stagnation and population declines. Therefore, local financial decisions are primary
concerns for local governments.
Second, Japan exhibits lower levels of female political representation than most
other developed and developing countries (Bochel and Bochel 2005; Eto 2010;
Khatwani 2006; Mikanagi 2001). Although the number of women in politics has
considerably increased recently, Japan offers an excellent setting to test the impact of
limited descriptive representation of women in local government. In addition, Japan
lags behind other advanced countries regarding gender equality. For instance, Japan
ranks very low among developed nations in maternal employment rates, gender gap
in full-time earnings, and ratio of women in managerial positions. Japan’s gender gap
is large and persistent (Estévez-Abe 2013). Therefore, male-dominant cultures and
norms are prevalent in Japan, which potentially shapes gendered behaviour of
managers in the public sphere. This study examines how gender representation
affects policy outcomes within a context of such male-dominant gendered
institutions.
Third, Japanese local governments have consistent administrative structures
regardless of geographic location and municipal size, allowing us to control for
institutional factors. Furthermore, Japanese regions are less diverse with respect to
culture, ethnicity, and economy than many developed countries. Such homogeneity
helps to control other factors that may influence our dependent variables. Finally, few
studies focus on local Japanese governments, despite Japan’s status as an advanced
democratic country. Consequently, this study also contributes to the recent increased
interest in contextual factors in public management and performance in a cross-
national setting (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017; O’Toole and Meier 2014)
by investigating one of the understudied context in public management.
Japan adopted a unitary political and administrative system with a two-tiered local
government structure: prefecture as the regional government unit and municipality
as the local government unit. Municipalities, in turn, are categorized as cities, towns,
or villages. As of April 2014, Japan has 47 prefectures and 1718 municipalities and, of
these, 790 are cities, 745 are towns, and 183 are villages (MIC 2014b).
Japanese local government structure consists of legislative and executive branches.
The relationship between legislative and executive bodies found in Japanese munici-
palities is classified as a ‘strong-mayor’ system in the USA. The chief executive holds
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exclusive power over all executive agencies (CLAIR 2013; Kawasaki 2000). Japanese
local governments have adopted the presidential system, in which the mayor and
local assembly members are directly elected by voters. Previously, the maximum
number of assembly seats was set by law and based on population size. However,
in 2011, the law changed, enabling municipalities to set the number of assembly seats
by ordinance (MIC 2015a). The mayor appoints a vice-mayor with the local assem-
bly’s consent. The vice-mayor supports the mayor’s initiatives and planning. Local
governments can determine the number of vice-mayors by ordinance (MIC n.d.-b;
Osugi 2009).
The mayor and the local assembly are separate and independent entities. This
Japanese structure has been adopted uniformly across municipalities (CLAIR 2013).
Mayors’ rights include enacting regulations, preparing budgets, proposing bills, and
appointing or dismissing staff. Local assemblies have voting rights in matters includ-
ing budget and ordinances and can conduct a no-confidence vote in mayors. To
provide the same standard of local government services across all municipalities, the
central government makes financial adjustments by distributing a certain portion of
the national tax to local governments based on financial capabilities (CLAIR 2013).
Most localities are largely dependent on national transfers, and all local governments
derive revenues from two sources: their own revenue collection and transfers from
upper-level governments. Municipalities’ own revenues come from local tax, fees,
rents, donations, and revenues from leasing and sales of municipal property.
Although variation exists across cities, average total self-revenue in 2012 amounted
to 47.03 per cent of cities’ total revenue. Local tax, which is the primary local revenue
source, accounted for 33.07 per cent of total revenue (MIC 2014a). The remaining
52.97 per cent of municipal revenues comes from central government and prefectural
governments (MIC 2015c).
Female representation in Japanese local government
Despite considerable improvements in the past decade, Japanese women’s represen-
tation in politics has been low compared with other developed and developing
countries. According to a survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union,
Japan’s share of women in its lower house of parliament reached only 9.5 per cent
in 2016, ranking Japan 155 out of 193 surveyed countries (Inter-Parliamentary Union
2016).
Female representation in local government is also low. In 2016, only 21 female
mayors served in 1721 city-, town-, and village-level municipalities, a 1.2 per cent
rate. In local legislatures, representation is higher but still low. In 2016, the average
share of female local councillors in municipal assemblies is 12.6 per cent. However,
across municipalities, considerable variation exists in female representation on local
councils (Cabinet Office of Japan 2016). Women’s representation in local adminis-
tration, while remaining low, is considerably higher than female representation at the
national administrative level. In 2015, the percentage of female local officials who
held more than middle-level managerial positions was 12.6 per cent across all
municipalities compared with 3.3 per cent at the national level (Cabinet Office of
Japan 2015a, 2015b).
Previous studies offer several explanations for low female political representation
in Japan. One explanation points to historical factors. Among industrialized nations,
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Japan was a relative latecomer to universal suffrage for women. While Japanese men
achieved universal suffrage for men in 1925, women’s voting rights and eligibility for
election were not granted until the end of World War II in 1945 (Bochel et al. 2003;
Bochel and Bochel 2005). Persistent male-dominated political culture might be
another explanation (Bochel et al. 2003; Eto 2010). Traditionally, Japanese political
parties, general public, and women consider Japanese politics to be men’s business
(Eto 2010). Moreover, having support from local groups (called koenkai) played a
pivotal role in candidates winning seats in the Diet’s lower house elections. Men, and
especially male councillors, have had strong local connections with koenkais, but
women tend to have less strong local networks, as married women tend to move to
residential areas where their husbands have connections (Bochel and Bochel 2005;
Ogai 2001). In this male-dominant political context, cultural norms hamper closing
the gender gap in political representation.
Data collection and variable operationalization
In this study, the unit of analysis is the municipality-year. We target all city-level munici-
palities from 2007 to 2012, covering 764 cities. Thirty-eight cities were dropped due to data
unavailability. Likewise, we focus on this time period due to data availability. To obtain
data on female representation, we rely on two data sets: (1)Handbook of Data on Japanese
Women in Political Life (2007 and 2011 editions) (Fusae Ichikawa Center for Women and
Governance 2008, 2011) and (2) the Cabinet Office’s report on gender equality (Gender
Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2007-2012). Mayoral political data are obtained from the
List of Mayors (2007–2012 editions) (Chihō Jichi SōgōKenkyūjo 2007-2012) and Profiles of
Governors and Mayors in Japan (2007–2012 editions) (Chihō Gyōzaisei Chōsakai 2007-
2012). Dependent variables and other control variables are collected from Regional
Statistics (MIC 2015c) and Settlement of Municipality Finances: 2006–2012 (MIC 2006-
2012).
Although our data set covers six years, most variables don’t have much within-
municipality variation because variables related to local councillors and mayors don’t
change much year to year. The term length of the Japanese local councils and mayors is
four years. In addition, no fixed start and end years for council and mayoral terms apply
to all municipalities. Approximately 30 per cent of all municipalities held mayoral and
local council elections in April 2011 and April 2007. However, elections were not held in
those years for the remaining 70 per cent of municipalities. Therefore, our six-year data
set covers at least two local council and mayoral terms per municipality. Variables, such
as conservative local council percentage, average elected terms of local councillors,
mayoral re-election, and mayor’s vote share, do not change within each term, but only
when new terms begin. Therefore, for most municipalities, variables related to local
councils and mayors are based on two data periods.1
Measuring financial decision-making
In this study, we focus on financial decision-making in terms of risk-taking behaviour
in local public finance. Specifically, we operationalize financial risk-taking behaviour
for three indicators: (1) municipal bonds issued per year, (2) municipal investment in
public corporations, and (3) municipal budget deposited for reserve funds. These
measurements are collected from annual reports of financial settlements of
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municipalities from 2007 to 2012. In Japanese local governments, only the mayor has
the right to submit a budget plan. However, the mayor’s budget plan is considered by
local councils, which may opt for approving, modifying, or denying the plan (Osugi
2008).
We assume issuing municipal bonds exemplifies risk-taking behaviour in financial
decision-making. Recent reforms largely increased local government discretion in issu-
ingmunicipal bonds. Prior to 2006, local governments needed to obtain approval to issue
municipal bonds from the governor or the central government. However, from April
2006 to 2012, local governments were only required to consult with the minister of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) or the prefectural governor
before issuing bonds. A 2012 reform gave municipalities freedom to issue bonds by
requiring only notification of theMICminister or the prefectural governor (MIC 2015b).
As our data covers 2007–2012, we investigate the period in whichmunicipalities had only
to consult with the minister or governor before issuing bonds, but had not yet reached
their current level of autonomy requiring only notification. Bond issuance is a contin-
uous variable reported in Japanese yen and per capita.
The second indicator operationalizing risk-taking behaviour in financial decision-
making is municipal investment in and contributions to public enterprise, quasi-public
corporations, or public corporations. In Japan, it’s common to see municipal investments
in and contributions to public hospitals or entities providing water, sewage, and transpor-
tation. In 2012, for example, 86 per cent of Japan’s total municipal investment and
contribution targeted such public municipal enterprises (MIC 2014a). Since 2002, public
enterprise businesses have been declining due to restructuring and municipal consolida-
tion (MIC n.d.-a). Moreover, a 2009 law provides local governments with incentives for
reducing debts and maintaining more financially sound management of these enterprises.
Therefore, given the decline in local public corporations and pressure for sound financial
management, we assume investing in and contributing local budgets to these entities is
risk-taking behaviour. Investment in public businesses is a continuous variable reported in
Japanese yen and per capita.
The third indicator operationalizing financial decision-making relates to municipal
budgets allocated to reserve funds in a given year. Reserve funds are established by
municipalities for the purpose of long-term financial stability and financial planning.
Reserve funds allow municipal governments to legally save money in order to finance
specific future projects and manage unexpected future expenditures. Therefore, saving
money in reserve funds should illustrate risk-averse behaviour in public finance. Reserve
fund allocation is a continuous variable reported in Japanese yen per capita.
Independent variables
In this study, we examine female representation in two local branches: legislative and
executive. Gender representation in local councils is operationalized by the percen-
tage of female councillors (H1a). As assembly seats vary across cites, for testing our
H1a, we calculated the percentage of female councillors in a council, rather than the
absolute number of female councillors (H1a). The data are obtained from the
Handbook of Data on Japanese Women in Political Life (2007 and 2011 editions)
(Kinenkai 2007; Kinenkai 2011). Female representation in administrative positions
refers to the percentage of local female employees in managerial positions (H1b).
Data are collected from the Cabinet Office’s report on gender equality (Gender
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Equality Bureau Cabinet Office 2007-2012). Female mayors and vice-mayors are
dummy variables. We assign a value of ‘1’ to municipalities with a female mayor or
vice-mayor and assign ‘0’ to those municipalities with neither a female mayor or vice-
mayor.
Regarding local councillor ideology (H2a), we focus on conservative ideology of local
legislators. In doing so, we calculate the percentage of councillors affiliated with the two
major conservative parties (Liberal Democratic Party and Komei Party). To test the
interactive H2b hypothesis, we created an interaction termmultiplying the percentage of
conservative legislators with the percentage of female legislators. Conservative ideology
variable is centred to reduce multicollinearity. To test the female councillors’ expertise
hypothesis (H3) for each council year, we calculate the average terms of all female
councillors. Here, tenure serves a proxy for female counsellors’ expertise. In Japan,
councillors may be re-elected indefinitely and no age limit exists.
Control variables
This study controls for factors expected to influence financial decision-making, including
political, socio-economic, and structural/organizational factors. Among political factors,
we control for mayors’ political ideology, re-election periods, vote share, and councillors’
political ideology. Given that Japanese mayoral candidates typically have no party designa-
tions, mayors’ political ideology is operationalized with a dummy, labelled ‘1’ when the
elected mayor received support from any conservative party (Liberal Democratic Party or
Komei Party) during his/her election campaign. Otherwise, it takes ‘0.’ As mayors may be
re-elected for an indefinite number of terms, their long-term experience in office should
influence financial decision-making. Therefore, we use a continuous variable to capture the
number of times a mayor has been re-elected. Mayors’ vote share is a continuous variable.
Demographic and socio-economic controls are (1) unemployment rate and (2) the
percentage of workers in agricultural, forestry, and fishing sector economy. We control
for one structural factor: whether the municipality has experienced a merger. Since 1999,
most Japanese local governments have experienced municipal mergers (Suzuki and
Sakuwa 2016; Yamada 2016). Hence, the number of municipalities declined from 3232
in 1999 to 1718 in 2014. Most mergers occurred in 2004 and 2005. The main impetus for
mergers was to take advantage of economies of scale, as municipalities with larger
populations deliver services at lower per capita or unit costs (Dollery, Byrnes, and
Crase 2007; Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006; Suzuki 2016). Therefore, municipal consolida-
tion is expected to reduce fixed costs and administrative duplication. If a municipality
experienced a merger, we assign a value of ‘1’; otherwise ‘0.’
Finally, we control for a municipality’s prior year’s accumulated debt and accu-
mulated reserve funds, as these factors are expected to influence future financial
decisions. Finally, we include a dummy variable for each year, leaving year 2007 as
the excluded category. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables.
Empirical strategies
We investigate the impact of female representation in local administrative bodies and
legislatures on risk-taking behaviour in public finance by using a panel data set of
Japanese municipalities from 2007 to 2012. We report random-effects estimations with
Huber–White standard errors. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. We
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employ the random-effectsmodel for several reasons. First, ourmain interest is in exploring
variations across municipalities, rather than variations within municipalities. Second, most
importantly, fixed-effects (FE) models are not possible in this study since values of female
councillors, our main explanatory variable of interest, changed only once during our data
period. This is because the local council term length is four years and our data set covers six
years. Therefore, only one change exists in gender composition of councillors, unless the
local council is dissolved or an election occurs to fill a vacancy. In addition, some
explanatory and control variables – such as legislators’ ideology, mayors’ re-election, and
municipal mergers – tend not to vary much within municipalities during six years. For
instance, the within-municipality standard deviations are close to zero for most indepen-
dent and control variables. For those regressors, most of the variation is between units
rather than within units. This constraint renders FE estimators inefficient because they rely
on within-unit variation (Cameron and Trivedi 2010).
As a remedy for limitations of our data set that prevent us from correcting for unit FE,
we conduct analysis with these empirical strategies. First, we use clustered standard errors
at the municipal level (Table 3). Second, we control for regional FE by using a region
dummy variable (Table 4). Third, we perform a series of robustness checks to demonstrate
empirical validity of findings. For example, Table A1 reports results obtained from similar
specificationmodels in which we dropped the agricultural sector economy variable, for it is
correlated with female councillors (r = −0.51), conservative ideology (r = −0.47), and lag of
accumulated debts/capita (r = 0.49). In addition, Tables A2 and A3 in the appendix report
population-averaged estimations, as well as pooled odinary least squares estimations of the
same specification models.
Table 2 shows a correlation matrix of all variables, which shows few instances of
autocorrelation. The variance inflation factors (VIF) for the regression models show
multicollinearity isn’t an issue (1.03 and 4.54). However, the higher value of VIF is
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Municipal bonds/capita 39,349.54 48,688.39 0 2,954,098
Public investment/capita 1457.88 3448.40 0 100,055
Reserve funds/capita 15,195.34 66,685.53 3.89 2,976,746
Independent variable
Female councillors (%) (H1a) 12.17 8.18 0 40.9
Female mayor or vice-mayor (H1b) 0.04 0.19 0 1
Female mid-level managers (%) (H1b) 8.70 6.47 0 44.1
Conservative ideology (%) (H2a) 16.57 14.90 0 79.17
Female councillors’ expertise/tenure (H3) 2.44 1.19 0 9
Controls
Mayor’s re-elections 1.76 0.99 1 10
Mayor’s vote share (%) 65.32 21.22 25.39 100
Mayor’s conservative party support 0.37 0.48 0 1
Unemployment rate (%) 6.21 1.66 2.4 18.20
Agricultural sector economy (%) 6.94 6.59 0.01 33.65
Municipal merger 0.50 0.50 0 1
Lag of accumulated debts/capita 440,994.00 235,014.40 25,727.03 4,173,950
Lag of accumulated reserves/capita 88,973.46 84,116.29 937.1074 1,536,181
Year dummy 3.50 1.71 1 6
Region dummy 3.47 1.99 0 7
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caused by an interaction term between female councillors and conservative ideology
(after centring). VIF values for other variables are below 2.0.
Explaining risk-taking behaviours in Japanese municipalities
Table 3 reports random-effect estimates for the impact of female representation on
risk-taking behaviour in local public finance, operationalized with three indicators:
municipal bonds/capita, investment in public corporations/capita, and municipal
budget allocated to reserve funds/capita. In Models 1 and 2 in Table 3, municipal
bond is the dependent variable. Model 1 includes independent and control variables.
Model 2 adds an interaction term between female councillor and conservative
ideology of local councillors to test H2b. We run the same models for two dependent
variables (public investment and reserve funds). In explaining municipal bonds
(Models 1–2), the coefficient of female councillors is negative and statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.01 level. Holding all other factors constant, as the percentage of
female legislators increases by 1 per cent, issuing of municipal bonds/capita will
decrease by 144.84 Japanese Yen (around 1.3 USD). Therefore, our hypothesis (H1a)
receives empirical support, as an increase in female councillors reduces municipal
bonds, holding all else constant. However, the coefficients of female mayor or vice-
mayor (H1b), female representation in middle-level managerial positions (H1b), and
female councillors’ expertise (H3) fail to reach statistical significance. Therefore, H1b
and H3 receive no empirical support. Conservative ideology of local councillors (H2)
is negatively and statistically significantly associated with municipal bonds. Holding
other factors constant, the stronger the conservative ideology in the local legislature,
the less likely the municipal government is to issue bonds. This finding confirms H2a.
However, the interaction term is not significant. Thus, H2b fails to receive empirical
support.
Two control variables show statistical significance. The coefficient of municipal
merger is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This finding makes
sense as the central government of Japan allowed local governments to issue more
bonds following municipal mergers to prepare for city planning after mergers. Lag of
accumulated debts/capita is positively associated with issuing municipal bonds at the
0.01 level. Holding all else constant, municipalities tend to issue more bonds in the
prior year their debt increases.
Model 3–4 in Table 3 explain our second dependent variable – municipal invest-
ment in public enterprise, quasi-public corporations, and public interest corpora-
tions. Model 3 includes independent and control variables, and Model 4 adds an
interaction term between female councillor and conservative ideology of local coun-
cillors to test H2b. According to Models 3 and 4, results show female councillors are
negatively associated with the dependent variable at the 0.01 confidence level.
Holding other factors constant, female representation in local councils reduces
risky investment in public enterprises. A 1 per cent increase in female councillor
representation reduces public investment/capita by 31.40 JP Yen (approximately 0.28
USD). The impact is not large; however, it shows a statistically significant impact of
female councillors on public investment, supporting H1a. Female mid-level managers
(H1b) are positively associated with the dependent variable, contrary to our expecta-
tion. However, the result is significant only at the 0.1 level. Coefficients of female
mayor or vice-mayor (H1b), conservative ideology (H2a), and female councillors’
1754 K. SUZUKI AND C. N. AVELLANEDA
expertise (H3) are not statistically significant. Furthermore, the interaction term
between female councillors and conservative ideology (H2b) does not reach a statis-
tically significant level of confidence. Therefore, H1b, H2a, H2b, and H3 receive no
empirical support. Regarding control variables, the coefficient of the lag of accumu-
lated debts/capita is positively associated with public investment at the 0.1 level.
Table 3. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model.
Municipal bonds Public investment Reserve funds

















Female mayor or −158.96 −127.84 688.81 687.45 −355.84 −473.63
vice-mayor (H1b) (1359.34) (1339.56) (737.42) (738.49) (1588.87) (1584.08)




(57.06) (57.41) (10.18) (10.25) (231.97) (230.40)
Conservative
ideology (%) (H2a)
−72.89*** −56.32 −4.57 −5.67 −171.64** −240.68**









−925.23 −940.14 48.13 48.56 1771.66 1821.35




41.87 44.58 64.14 64.05 −1547.80 −1553.75
(352.95) (350.97) (44.52) (44.36) (1368.37) (1368.58)
Mayor’s vote share
(%)
−50.48 −50.92 −1.07 −1.05 −0.34 1.27




150.97 177.37 −138.00 −138.82 −336.18 −436.67
(823.01) (809.64) (133.21) (134.78) (1938.48) (1902.89)
Unemployment
rate (%)
364.08 363.01 101.88 102.05 2302.88*** 2307.26***
(253.43) (253.21) (76.12) (76.17) (846.07) (843.62)
Agricultural sector
economy (%)
213.22 216.34 −3.47 −3.63 −140.49 −152.20
(142.92) (146.88) (21.00) (21.14) (204.81) (198.52)
Municipal merger 7019.71*** 7013.22*** −19.86 −18.77 −6632.08 −6587.93




0.06*** 0.06*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.02** 0.02**




−0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22*** 0.22***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.08)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummy No No No No No No
Constant 5890.83 5931.31 −23.20 −27.10 −21,241.64** −21,381.53**
(5143.57) (5184.69) (847.81) (843.85) (9661.87) (9612.97)
Observations 4547 4547 4547 4547 4547 4547
Number of
municipality
764 764 764 764 764 764
R-sq within 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.12
R-sq between 0.62 0.62 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Finally, Models 5–6 in Table 3 explain municipal budget allocated to reserve
funds. According to Table 3, in Model 6, none of the gender-related variables show
statistical significance. That is, neither female representation in local legislatures nor
female representation in municipal administration seems to influence financial deci-
sion-making in terms of allocating budget to reserve funds. Therefore, H1a, H1b,
H2b, and H3 fail to receive empirical support. However, the conservative ideology
variable (H2a) is negatively associated with reserve funds at the 0.05 confident level.
Holding all other factors constant, a 1 per cent increase in the number of conservative
councillors reduces municipal budget allocation to reserve funds by 171 to 240 JP
Yen (1.53 to 2.15 USD). Although this coefficient is statistically significant, this
finding fails to support H2a, for its sign has opposite direction.
Three of our control variables gain statistical significance. The coefficient of
unemployment rate is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This result
suggests that after holding all else constant, for each 1-percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate, the municipal budget allocated to reserve funds/capita tends
to increase by 2302 to 2307 JP Yen (approximately 21 USD). Likewise, the coefficients
of lag of accumulated debts/capita and lag of accumulated reserves/capita are positive
and statistically significant at the 0.05 level and 0.01 level, respectively; however, their
impacts are very small (0.02–0.22). If a municipality has more accumulated debts or
financial reserves in prior years, it is likely to allocate more money to reserve funds.
Table 4 reports results of the same models with a region dummy variable. We
conduct this analysis as a robustness check and to control for regional FE. Table 4
shows that coefficients of female councillors (H1a) and conservative ideology
(H2a) are negative and statistically significant at 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively,
even after controlling for region FE. These findings demonstrate the robustness of
our results.
Coefficients of female mid-level manager, which were positive and significant only at
the 0.1 level in the main model (Table 3), are no longer significant in Models 3–4
(Table 4). In the appendix, we report the series of results of our robustness check
models. In Models 1–2, coefficients of female councillors are negative and statistically
significant at the 0.01 level in two of our robustness check models (Tables A1 and A3).
In the population-averaged model (Table A2), the significance level for female council-
lors decreases, but it is still significant at the 0.1 level. Therefore, these results demon-
strate robustness of negative impacts of female councillors on municipal bonds (H1a).
The link between conservative ideology and municipal bonds is statistically sig-
nificant at the 0.05 level across our robustness check models, giving empirical support
to H2a. Regarding the public investment models (Models 3–4), the female councillor
variable is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level across two of our three
robustness check models, demonstrating robustness of the results for H1a. The
female mid-level manager variable is not significant across two robustness check
models. Thus, results suggest that H1b receives no empirical support. In Models 5–6,
conservative ideology is negative and significant at the 0.05 level across two models
(Tables A2 and A3) and at the 0.1 level (Table A1). Thus, impacts of conservative
ideology on reserve funds remain robust after testing different models.
We conducted an additional robustness check. Since our study may need to control
for whether there is a local unified versus divided government, we created a dummy
variable labelled ‘unified government.’We gave it a value of ‘1’ if more than 50 per cent
of local councillors in a municipal council supported the elected mayor during his/her
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election; otherwise, it received a value of ‘0.’ In other words, a value of ‘1’ means the
mayor works under a unified government. We reran the same models reported in
Table 4, after including the ‘unified government’ variable. However, results did not
change significantly.2 In sum, our robustness check results demonstrate findings from
our main models (Table 3) survive through analysis with three robustness check models.
As expected, gender representation in local councils is negatively correlated with risk-
taking behaviour measures represented by issuing municipal bonds and
budget allocation to public investment, holding all other factors constant (H1a).
Conservative ideology is negatively associated with municipal bonds, one of the risk-
taking behavior measures. However, we do not find empirical support for the impact of
female representation in the administrative body (H1b), multiplicative effects of female
councillors and conservative ideology (H2b), or female councillors’ expertise (H3).
Discussions and limitations
In this study, our first goal is to test how female representation in local legislatures,
mayoral and vice-mayoral positions, and municipal mid-level managerial positions
affects financial decision-making. Our second and third goals are to test whether
political ideology of local councils and expertise of female elected officials affect
Table 4. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model
with region dummy.
Municipal bonds Public investment Reserve funds



















776.44 763.36 758.13 754.76 −2183.63 −2170.02




24.86 23.52 14.85 14.60 −257.17 −255.75
(65.45) (66.09) (9.69) (9.77) (243.84) (239.31)
Conservative
ideology (%) (H2a)
−83.14** −95.69 −4.03 −8.37 −146.14** −131.77









−890.04 −879.48 69.43 70.68 1519.07 1506.95
(710.05) (714.11) (50.62) (50.51) (1123.26) (1116.93)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 14,831.82 14,830.20 1924.07* 1916.74* −23,758.12** −23,742.62**
(18,955.80) (18,957.08) (1022.73) (1021.36) (10,371.74) (10,365.91)
Observations 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
Number of
municipality
752 752 752 752 752 752
R-sq within 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11
R-sq between 0.61 0.61 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08
Control variables are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
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municipal financial decisions. Financial decision-making is assessed in terms of
municipal risk-taking behaviour through three indicators: issuing municipal bonds/
capita, investing in public enterprises/capita, and allocating budget to reserve funds/
capita. To test our propositions, we rely on a data set derived from 764 Japanese city-
level governments from 2007 to 2012. After controlling for potential confounding
factors, findings show neither expertise of female councillors nor female representa-
tion in executive and mid-level managerial positions seem to influence municipal
financial decision-making. Likewise, we do not find any multiplicative effect of
female council representation and conservative ideology. However, results show
female representation in local councils is positively correlated with risk-averse beha-
viour in financial decisions. Specifically, female representation in city councils is
negatively associated with both issuing municipal bonds and local investment in
public corporations. Likewise, a strong negative link exists between conservative
ideology and issuing municipal bonds and contributing to reserve funds.
Although the number of female legislators is small, results suggest they tend to
be risk averse in financial decision-making. This finding agrees with studies
examining gender–financial behaviour relationship in private organizations
(Barua et al. 2010; Charness and Gneezy 2012; Eckel and Grossman 2002;
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998). The relatively low female representation in
Japanese local legislatures and/or male-dominant gendered institutions might
explain the small effect of female legislators and the lack of an effect of female
representation in executive and managerial positions on cities’ financial beha-
viour. Moreover, results might suggest in the Japanese context, credentials and
performance of women in leadership positions may not be fairly evaluated or may
be disadvantaged by organizational members compared to male counterparts
(Eagly, Makhijani, and Klonsky 1992; Kathlene 1994).
Furthermore, the small or non-existent effect of female representation may be due
to socialization effects characteristic of male-dominant cultures (Quintelier 2013). In
general, Japanese women tend not to hold prominent leadership positions with
strong influence in organizational decision-making, and they may develop attitudes
and behaviours similar to those of male leaders. These attitudes are expected to
influence female behaviours in elected posts or any other settings with decision-
making roles. Prouteau and Tabariés (2010) illustrate women’s socialization effects in
French voluntary organizations. In sum, in a patriarchal society like Japan’s, female
councillors and managers may encounter more obstacles, which suppresses the
expected effects of gender representation on financial decision-making. Without
more detailed data of internal decision-making process, we are not able to examine
how the above factors may moderate gender–decision-making relationship.
Another explanation for the small or non-existent effect of women local repre-
sentation on financial decision-making points to the relatively low performance in
terms of proposing new legislation. Japanese local legislators tend to pass or modify
mayors’ propositions. For instance, only 10.7 per cent of city-level local councils
issued any vote against a mayor’s proposition and only 8 per cent of councils
submitted a proposal for municipal ordinances in 2011 (Hirose and Local Council
Reform Forum 2012). However, some municipalities are more proactive. For
instance, local councils in Shibuya and Osaka submitted 20 and 17 ordinance
proposals, respectively, in 2011, and Kochi city’s local council submitted 36 revisions
to mayoral legislation in 2009 (Hirose and Local Council Reform Forum 2009-2014).
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Such contextual factors may restrict the expected negative influence of female
representation in local governments’ financial decision-making. However, conversely,
our evidence suggests that even in a context characterized by local passive legislatures
with low gender equality, gender representation in local councils has a negative
impact on local financial decision-making.
Our study has limitations. Our data set covers only six years, typically correspond-
ing to only two municipal terms. The fact that Japanese municipalities did not gain
autonomy in financial decision-making until after this study also imposes a limita-
tion. Second, data unavailability impedes us from assessing the role of women’s
committee assignments in local assemblies and the role of female councillors’ career
and educational backgrounds. Third, our study assessed relationships between female
representation and risk-taking/averse outcomes of public finance, not a causal
mechanism between them, due to the nature of our data set. One needs time-series
or experimental data to make causal arguments. Even so, this study contributes to the
literature by examining the understudied link between female representation and
local public finance.
Conclusions
In studying this link, we examine elected and administrative positions in an under-
studied developed setting: Japanese local governments. Japan is a relevant case to
study, as it ranks very low in gender representation in politics among developed and
developing countries. Although studies have addressed gender representation and
financial risk-taking behaviour in the private sector, scarce attention has been given
to local public finances.
This study contributes to the understanding of the association between gender
representation and local public finance. Findings suggest a significant link between
female councillors and outputs in public finance. Findings also suggest the gender–
financial decision-making relationship observed in private organizations holds in the
context of public organizations. After controlling for potential confounding factors,
findings show female representation on local councils and conservative ideology are
positively correlated with risk-averse behaviour in financial decisions. Specifically,
female representation in city councils is negatively associated with issuing municipal
bonds and local investment in public corporations. Likewise, conservative ideology is
negatively correlated to issuing municipal bonds and budget allocation to reserve
funds. We do not find financial decision-making effects of female representation
among executives and mid-level managers. This lack of impact may be due to the
small numbers of Japanese female mayors and vice-mayors. For instance, only 3.5 per
cent of city-level municipalities had a female mayor or vice-mayor in 2012. Such low
levels of female representation in executive positions may impede gender effects on
financial decision-making. Future research should explore whether these findings
hold when investigating the effects of female representation at other governmental
levels. Moreover, survey studies of female legislators and managers in the executive
branch should be conducted to shed light on female preferences in financial decision-
making.
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Notes
1. The Handbook of Data on Japanese Women in Political Life is issued every four years and
contains data regarding female representation in the local council only in the year of publica-
tion (2007, 2011). In other words, in our data set (2007–2012), the handbook does not provide
data in 2008–2010 or 2012. In filling this gap, we use data from 2007 and 2011 for these years,
depending on the starting year of each local councillor’s term. Local council term data are
collected from the List of Local Chief Executives (2007–2012 editions) (Chihō Jichi Sōgō
Kenkyūjo, 2007-2012). Regarding two socio-economic control variables (unemployment rate
and agricultural sector economy), we use the value in 2005 for the years of 2007, 2008, and 2009
and the value in 2010 for the years of 2010, 2011, and 2012, because these variables are available
only in the years of 2005 and 2010.
2. Additionally, we rerun the same models with the ‘disaster’ dummy variable to include the
effects of the 2011 earthquake in our analysis. However, except for one variable – conservative
ideology – in general results and statistical significances do not change drastically.
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Appendix
Table A1. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: random-effects model
without agricultural sector economy variable.
Municipal bonds Public investment Reserve funds




−188.59*** −193.22*** −25.96** −26.58** −25.47 −20.55
(62.41) (64.24) (11.57) (12.05) (110.58) (113.45)
Female mayor or
vice-mayor (H1b)
525.71 503.71 755.67 752.43 −1909.73 −1887.08
(1242.53) (1245.77) (750.23) (750.35) (1939.68) (1921.31)
Female mid-level
managers (%) (H1b)
15.30 12.83 14.76 14.51 −246.53 −243.97
(66.95) (67.79) (9.64) (9.72) (238.26) (233.51)
Conservative
ideology (%) (H2a)
−110.00*** −133.97** −4.56 −8.97 −112.52* −86.04









−946.57 −925.33 68.98 70.30 1571.31 1549.11
(738.99) (737.97) (50.83) (50.70) (1124.61) (1115.46)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 17,307.25 17,270.88 1975.72* 1963.42* −26,719.01** −26,661.78**
(20,482.46) (20,473.12) (1051.98) (1049.17) (11,103.58) (11,049.00)
Observations 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
Number of
municipality
752 752 752 752 752 752
R-sq within 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11 0.11
R-sq between 0.62 0.62 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15
R-sq overall 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.08
Control variables are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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Table A3. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: pooled OLS model.
Municipal bonds Public investment Reserve funds




−150.91*** −153.55*** −18.62 −16.23 −53.37 −61.35
(53.92) (56.25) (12.33) (12.58) (103.08) (104.62)
Female mayor or vice-
mayor (H1b)
776.44 763.36 560.61 572.40 −2346.90 −2386.37
(1267.56) (1269.94) (684.02) (684.01) (2057.62) (2040.19)
Female mid-level
managers (%) (H1b)
24.86 23.52 43.44*** 44.65*** −259.69 −263.73
(65.45) (66.09) (15.12) (15.47) (224.53) (221.78)
Conservative ideology
(%) (H2a)
−83.14** −95.69 1.78 13.10 −129.67** −167.53*








−890.04 −879.48 128.79* 119.27 1057.10 1088.94
(710.05) (714.11) (75.77) (76.95) (903.19) (901.64)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 14,831.82 14,830.20 779.34 780.80 −20,250.26** −20,255.15**
(18,955.80) (18,957.08) (1089.88) (1092.11) (9577.12) (9576.79)
Observations 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.08
Control variables are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table A2. Explaining risk-taking behaviour in public finance in Japanese municipalities: population-averaged
model.
Municipal bonds Public investment Reserve funds




−106.98* −108.70* −25.30** −25.97** −59.43 −63.72
(55.34) (58.47) (11.33) (11.86) (106.04) (106.81)
Female mayor or vice-
mayor (H1b)
461.98 453.59 757.66 754.48 −2298.76 −2320.29
(1310.09) (1310.94) (748.54) (748.76) (2040.44) (2021.88)
Female mid-level
managers (%) (H1b)
11.61 10.75 15.01 14.71 −260.11 −262.29
(71.19) (71.45) (9.67) (9.75) (230.87) (227.45)
Conservative ideology
(%) (H2a)
−89.21*** −97.11* −3.96 −8.25 −135.32** −156.04








−829.67 −822.58 69.66 70.82 1208.08 1224.03
(667.79) (674.10) (50.47) (50.36) (970.16) (967.17)
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 8968.93 8969.80 1916.12* 1911.31* −21,386.34** −21,383.95**
(14,247.64) (14,248.49) (1020.18) (1018.62) (9810.61) (9807.02)
Observations 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481 4481
Number of municipality 752 752 752 752 752 752
Control variables are not reported.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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